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Abstract  We  examine  real  activities  manipulation  by  firms  prior  to  their  debt  issuances  and
how such  manipulation  activities  affect  bond  yield  spreads.  We  find  that  bond-issuing  firms
increase their  real  activities  manipulation  in  the  five  quarters  leading  to  a  bond  issuance.  We
document  an  inverse  association  between  yield  spread  and  pre-issue  real  activities  manipula-
tion, i.e.,  firms  engaged  in  abnormally  high  levels  of  real  activities  manipulation  are  associated
with subsequent  lower  cost  of  debt.
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e  examine  the  presence  of  real  earnings  management  (RM)
round  bond  issues  and  their  impact  on  the  cost  of  issued
onds.1 As  per  Roychowdhury  (2006),  firms  engage  in  RM
ctivities  either  to  avoid  reporting  losses  or  to  respond  to
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1 In this paper, RM, REM, real earnings management and real activ-
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reativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).revailing  economic  conditions.  We  find  that  there  exists
re-issue  real  activities  manipulation  at  bond  issuing  firms,
hich  subsequently  reduces  their  cost  of  debt.
Earnings  management  can  be  divided  into  two,  i.e.,
ccruals-based  earnings  management  (AM)  and  real  activ-
ties  manipulation  (RM).  AM  involves  accounting  manipula-
ions  with  little  to  no  cash  flow  consequences.  Conversely,
M  impacts  the  firm  cash  flows  more  significantly.
oychowdhury  (2006)  examines  firms’  RM  practices  and
nds  that  manipulating  firms  attempt  to  avoid  losses  by
i)  offering  price  discounts  to  artificially  boost  sales  fig-
res;  (ii)  overproduction  that  results  in  high  inventory  figures
nd  reduces  the  cost  of  sales  to  boost  the  firm’s  reported
arnings;  and,  (iii)  reducing  discretionary  expenditure  (for



















































Real  earnings  management  activities  prior  to  bond  issuance  
instance,  research  and  development  (R&D))  to  improve
margins.  Such  actions,  which  constitute  RM,  are  likely  to
adversely  affect  the  firm’s  long  run  profitability  and  cash
flows  (Roychowdhury,  2006;  Wang  and  D’Souza,  2006; Cohen
and  Zarowin,  2010;  Zang,  2012).
AM  and  RM  collectively  form  earnings  management  prac-
tices;  however,  this  paper  examines  RM,  and  not  AM,  for  the
following  reasons.  The  effect  of  AM  on  the  cost  of  debt  is
already  documented  in  Francis  et  al.  (2005),  Bharath  et  al.
(2008),  Prevost  et  al.  (2008),  and  Liu  et  al.  (2010).  They  find
that  firms  managing  earnings  upwards  issue  debt  at  a  lower
cost.  Liu  et  al.  (2010)  conclude  that  bondholders  fail  to  see
through  the  inflated  earnings  numbers  in  pricing  new  debt.
However,  the  focus  of  the  studies  was  solely  on  AM.  Since
the  cash  flow  consequences  of  AM  and  RM  differ  as  well  as
their  use  (see  Zang,  2012),  the  results  based  on  AM  cannot
be  extended  to  firms  that  manage  earnings  using  RM.  Fol-
lowing  the  passage  of  the  2002  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act  (SOX),
more  firms  are  using  RM  than  AM  (Cohen  et  al.,  2008)  as  it
is  more  difficult  to  charge  management  for  engaging  in  RM,
which  is  often  disguised  as  normal  business  decisions.  Since
investors  rely  heavily  on  issuing  firm’s  financial  reports  to
price  a  new  bond  issue,  we  attempt  to  fill  a  gap  in  the  lit-
erature  by  examining  RM  (which  is  widely  acknowledged  as
a  common  practice  (Graham  et  al.,  2005)  that  affect  the
financial  reports  on  which  investors  rely  for  bond  pricing
decisions.
Our  sample  consists  of  1578  bond  issuers  from  1980  to
2012.  We  follow  the  same  methods  as  in  Roychowdhury
(2006)  and  Zang  (2012)  to  compute  the  proxies  for  real  earn-
ings  management.  We  find  that  firms  increase  the  use  of
real  earnings  management  prior  to  a  bond  issue.  Next,  there
exists  an  inverse  association  between  the  pre-issue  level  of
real  earnings  management  and  bonds’  yield  spread.  We  also
document  an  increase  in  issuing  firms’  use  of  real  earnings
management  post-SOX.  Lastly,  earnings  manipulating  firms
tend  to  be  large  and  profitable,  yet  they  exhibit  more  earn-
ings  volatility  as  well  as  issue  more  noninvestment  grade
bonds.
Our  findings  contrast  with  Ge  and  Kim  (2014). To  start
with,  there  are  significant  differences  between  our  sam-
ples  and  data  sources  that  could  explain  the  divergent
results  and  we  discuss  them  later  in  the  paper.  Ge  and
Kim  (2014)  find  a  positive  association  between  bonds’  risk
premiums  and  the  following  two  factors:  sales  manipula-
tion  and  overproduction.  They  find  no  significant  association
between  the  risk  premium  and  each  of  abnormal  discre-
tionary  expenditure  and  the  composite  score  of  real  earnings
management.  In  contrast,  we  find  an  inverse  association
between  bonds’  yield  spreads  and  each  of  abnormal  pro-
duction  cost,  abnormal  discretionary  expenditure,  total  real
earnings  management  as  well  as  unexpected  total  real  earn-
ings  management.  Thus,  our  findings  are  more  consistent
across  a  greater  number  of  real  earnings  management  varia-
bles.
It  is  important  to  note  that  not  all  earnings  management
are  construed  as  managerial  opportunism.  For  instance,  a
firm  may  accrue  more  production  costs  in  anticipation  of
increased  demand  (i.e.,  growth  for  which  it  needs  to  raise
more  financing).  Similarly,  a  firm  may  postpone  discretionary
expenses  to  prioritize  investments  in  productive  capacity






lso  reduce  costs  and  improve  liquidity.  Likewise,  firms  may
anipulate  earnings  in  the  short  run  to  promote  a  bond  issue
ithout  necessarily  suggesting  that  they  are  misrepresent-
ng  the  accounts.  Thus,  until  we  can  clearly  differentiate
etween  good  and  bad  earnings  management  (a  weakness  of
ur  paper  that  we  acknowledge  in  the  conclusion),  there  is
he  risk  that  the  findings  would  be  dependent  on  the  samples
nd  methods  used.
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Literature
eview  and  Hypotheses  Development  Section  presents  the
elated  literature  and  hypothesis  development.  Data  Sec-
ion  describes  the  data.  Methodology  Section  elaborates  the
esearch  methodology.  Empirical  Results  Section  discusses
he  results.  Summary  and  Conclusions  Section  concludes  the
aper.
iterature review and hypotheses
evelopment
he  phenomenon  of  earnings  management  has  been  docu-
ented  in  issuances  of  equity  as  well  as  debt.  Teoh  et  al.
1998a)  suggest  that  initial  public  offering  (IPO)  firms  man-
ge  accruals  upwards  to  inflate  earnings  (also  see  Chaney
nd  Lewis  (1998), Morsfield  and  Tan  (2006)).  The  authors  find
igh-accrual  IPOs  post-issuance  stock  return  performance  to
e  disappointing.  Thus,  there  is  little  justification  for  the
nitial  investor  enthusiasm  toward  these  IPOs.
Conversely,  Ball  and  Shivakumar  (2008)  and  Chang  et  al.
2010)  IPO  findings  are  opposite  to  the  above.  In  the  main,
hese  authors  conclude  that  investors’  due  diligence  as  well
s  underwriters’  reputation  inhibit  high-quality  firms  from
ngaging  in  accruals  manipulations  (also  see  Hei  Wai  et  al.,
012).
Rangan  (1998),  Teoh  et  al.  (1998b), Shivakumar  (2000),
nd  Cohen  and  Zarowin  (2010)  document  earnings  manage-
ent  at  firms  engaged  in  seasoned  equity  offerings  (SEOs).
angan  (1998)  and  Teoh  et  al.  (1998b)  find  that  manipula-
ors  are  associated  with  poor  post-issue  performance.  While
ost  of  the  findings  are  based  on  AM,  Cohen  and  Zarowin
2010)  document  that  SEO  firms  also  engage  in  RM.  The
uthors  find  that  post-SEO  operating  underperformance  is
ot  driven  solely  by  accrual  reversals,  but  also  due  to  RM.
othari  et  al.  (2015)  observe  that  RM  is  positively  associated
ith  overvaluation  at  the  time  of  SEO.  However,  these  firms
nderperform  in  the  long  run.
Nonetheless,  the  findings  based  on  equity  issues  cannot
e  extended  to  debt  issues  in  a  straightforward  manner.
hile  both  equity  and  debt  are  sources  of  finance  to  a  com-
any,  yet  only  debt  can  lead  the  firm  to  bankruptcy.  The
nancial  burden  imposed  by  debt  on  the  company  is  far
reater  than  that  of  equity.  Shareholders  are  the  residual
laimants  and  in  the  normal  course  of  business  there  is  no
bligation  imposed  legally  on  the  firm  to  pay  them.
Liu  et  al.  (2010)  document  that  firms  manage  earnings
pward  by  manipulating  discretionary  accruals  (AM)  prior  to
ond  issues.  They  also  find  that  such  firms  can  issue  debt  at
 low  cost  and  bondholders  fail  to  see  through  the  inflated
arnings  numbers  in  pricing  new  debts  (also  see  Alissa  et  al.,
013).  This  could  be  due  to  the  self-reverting  property  of
ccruals,  which  implies  that  the  real  cash  flow  consequences









































































































sury  bond.  A  company’s  YS  is  the  weighted  average  of  all  its
bonds’  YS  in  each  quarter.  On  average,  the  maturity  of  the
bonds  is  46.45  quarters  (i.e.,  11.6  years)  and  carry  a  credit
rating  of  13.5,  which  is  equivalent  to  a  BBB  S&P  rating.266  
onsequences  of  RM  (the  subject  of  this  paper)  are  real  and
ar-reaching.  Thus,  it  is  essential  to  reconsider  bond  issuers’
se  of  earnings  management  using  real  activities  manipula-
ions  (RM).
As  argued  earlier,  the  passage  of  SOX  has  made  it  more
ifficult  to  engage  in  AM  and  more  managers  dread  the  legal
onsequences  of  the  act  (also  see  Cohen  et  al.,  2008).  RM  is
ikely  to  be  perceived  more  of  a  business  decision  and  less
f  an  accounting  manipulation  than  AM.  Next,  Zang  (2012)
xplains  that  managers’  first  choice  is  to  use  RM  during  the
ear  and  then  to  use  AM  at  end  of  the  year  to  achieve  targets.
o  the  extent  that  RM  is  sufficient  to  meet  the  targets,  there
s  no  recourse  to  AM.
Crabtree  et  al.  (2014)  examine  a  sample  of  newly  issued
onds  between  1990  and  2007.  They  find  that  RM  is  asso-
iated  with  lower  bond  ratings  and  the  authors  conclude
hat  bond  rating  analysts  do  not  view  RM  in  a  positive  light.
owever,  the  actual  RM  monitoring  performed  by  such  ana-
ysts  is  arguable.  Alissa  et  al.  (2013)  argue  that  ratings
gencies  do  not  see  their  role  as  auditors  and  accept  that
ublished  financial  statements  are  reasonable  and  accu-
ate  (Securities  and  Exchange  Commission,  2003;  Standard
nd  Poor’s,  2006).  The  competition  among  rating  agencies
urther  diminish  their  incentives  to  monitor  earnings  man-
gement  at  client  firms.
Ge  and  Kim  (2014)  examine  the  relationship  between  RM
nd  the  cost  of  debt,  and  the  authors  document  a  positive
elationship  between  the  two.  In  the  main,  the  authors  argue
hat  the  adverse  consequences  of  RM  on  the  business  earn-
ngs  and  cash  flows  lead  bond  investors  to  demand  a  high
ate  of  return.  However,  they  do  not  clarify  how  investors
re  able  to  identify  and  interpret  the  true  consequences  of
M,  which  are  difficult  to  establish.  To  the  extent  that  RM
eads  to  a  higher  cost  of  debt,  then  it  is  hard  to  imagine
hy  would  bond  issuers  engage  in  RM  to  pay  a  higher  cost  of
ebt.
Instead,  we  hypothesize  that  bond  issuers  might  use  RM  to
ignal  their  superior  earnings  quality  to  potential  investors.
hile  RM  can  potentially  affect  future  cash  flows,  yet  it
oosts  short-term  earnings.  The  improved  earnings  figures
ould  assist  the  bond  issuer  in  successfully  selling  its  bond
ssue  at  a  lower  cost  of  debt.  The  new  funds  raised  from  the
ssue  would,  in  turn,  serve  the  firm  to  resolve  any  poten-
ial  loss  owing  to  the  above-average  use  of  RM  prior  to  the
ssue.  These  arguments  lead  to  the  testable  hypothesis  that
rms,  who  successfully  raise  new  funding  from  bond  issues,
re  not  affected  by  the  long-term  adverse  consequences
f  RM,  since  the  new  funds  raised  are  used  to  remedy  any
ubsequent  problem  caused  by  RM.
Alternatively,  these  firms  use  RM  prior  to  the  bond  issue
o  signal  their  superior  earnings  quality,  which  would  mean
hat  they  would  be  associated  with  a  lower  cost  of  debt.
here  is  ample  evidence  (e.g.,  Robbins  and  Schatzberg,
986;  Hsueh  and  Kidwell,  1988;  Hansen  and  Crutchley,
990;  Davidson  et  al.,  1995;  Covitz  and  Harrison,  2004)
o  suggest  that  bond  issuers  engage  in  signaling  activities,
nd  we  offer  a  test  of  the  signaling  hypothesis  through
he  examination  of  firms’  pre-issue  use  of  real  activi-
ies  manipulations.  Alissa  et  al.  (2013)  find  evidence  to
uggest  that  firms  manage  earnings  to  achieve  their  tar-
et  ratings.  We  hypothesize  that  a  firm  desiring  to  signal
ts  quality  to  bond  investors  would  engage  in  RM,  which
T
r
C.  Mellado-Cid  et  al.
ould  support  the  firm  in  signaling  its  quality  to  the
nvestors.
To  the  extent  that  RM  increases  the  information  asym-
etry  between  the  bond  issuer  and  the  bond  investor,  it
s  difficult  to  imagine  the  basis  upon  which  bond  investors
ould  penalize  these  issuers  (since  they  know  less  than  the
ssuer).  Besides,  it  is  well  documented  that  RM  is  difficult  to
pot  in  the  short  run  (for  instance,  see  Zang,  2012).  Thus,
he  practice  of  RM  immediately  prior  to  a  bond  issue  has
he  potential  to  sway  investors’  perception  in  a  favorable
ight  and,  in  consequence,  benefit  the  firm  from  a  lower
ost  of  debt.  There  is  evidence  to  suggest  that  firms  using  RM
re  able  to  achieve  their  short-term  targets.  For  instance,
hojraj  et  al.  (2009)  find  that  investors  react  favorably  to
he  shares  of  firms  that  manage  to  just  beat  analysts’  fore-
asts  using  RM.  Similarly,  Cohen  and  Zarowin  (2010),  and
othari  et  al.  (2015)  document  share  price  increases  at  the
ime  of  equity  offering  by  firms  engaged  in  RM.
ata
e  obtain  data  on  bond  issues  by  US  firms  from  the  SDC
latinum  New  Issues  database.  Our  sample  period  starts  in
980  and  ends  in  2012.  We  eliminate  observations  without
ata  on  total  proceeds  and  yield  spread.  We  also  eliminate
rms  that  are  not  listed  in  Compustat  and  CRSP.  We  calculate
arious  proxies  of  earnings  management  for  the  12  quarters
urrounding  the  quarter  of  the  bond  issue.  The  final  sam-
le  size  consists  of  5608  firm-quarter  observations,  which  is
quivalent  to  1578  firms.
Table  1  shows  the  distribution  of  the  final  sample  by
ear,  bond  ratings  and  industry.  The  number  of  bond  issues
as  increased  since  1990.  Most  of  the  bond  issues  do  not
ave  restrictive  covenants  (96.9%)  and  are  investment  grade
onds  (60.3%).  About  16.5%  of  the  sample  is  from  the  man-
facturing  industry,  followed  by  the  wholesale,  retail,  and
ervices  (14.9%)  and  other  industries  (17%).
We  report  sample  descriptive  statistics  in  Table  1.  Bond
ssuers  tend  to  be  large  firms,  with  average  sales  of  $3157
illion  and  assets  of  $13,993  million.  However,  the  high
tandard  deviation  in  total  assets  suggests  considerable  vari-
tions  in  firm  size.  On  average,  bond  issuers  finance  their
usiness  with  67%  in  debt.  The  sample  firms  are  low  on  pro-
tability  (for  instance,  the  mean  ROA  is  0.76%)  and  have  a
ean  market  to  book  ratio  of  2.2.
The  mean  proceed  of  the  bond  issues  is  $313.05  million,
nd  the  yield  spread  is  257.19  basis  points,  which  is  similar
o  Liu  et  al.  (2010)  and  Klock  et  al.  (2005), who  report  mean
ield  spreads  of  224  and  245  basis  points,  respectively.  We
se  yield  spread  (YS)  as  the  proxy  for  the  firm’s  cost  of  debt.
S,  measured  in  basis  points,  is  the  difference  between  the
ond’s  yield  and  the  yield  on  a maturity-matched  U.S.  Trea-2 See Appendix 2 on assigning numerical values to bond ratings.
o proxy for ratings, we use the Standard and Poor’s (S&P) credit
atings. Following Klock et al. (2005), we start with a value of 22 for
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Table  1  Sample  distribution  and  descriptive  statistics.
Issue  Year  N  Percent
1980  53  0.95
1981 32  0.57
1982 67  1.2
1983 44  0.79
1984 46  0.82
1985 93  1.67
1986 136  2.44
1987 95  1.7
1988 69  1.24
1989 69  1.24
1990 61  1.09
1991 126  2.26
1992 175  3.13
1993 221  3.96
1994 109  1.95
1995 168  3.01
1996 166  2.97
1997 239  4.28
1998 378  6.77
1999 257  4.6
2000 137  2.45
2001 294  5.27
2002 258  4.62
2003 283  5.07
2004 213  3.81
2005 173  3.1
2006 158  2.83
2007 178  3.19
2008 135  2.42
2009 281  5.03
2010 290  5.19
2011 239  4.28
2012 341  6.11
Total 5584  100
N Percent
Covenants
No  5397  96.65
Yes 187  3.35
Bond Rating
Noninvestment  2218  39.72
Investment  3366  60.28
Industry
Business  Equipment 443  7.93
Chemicals  and  Allied
Products
402  7.2
Consumer  Durables  167  2.99
Energy 628  11.25
Healthcare,  Medical
Equipment,  and  Drugs
300  5.37
Manufacturing  921  16.49
Consumer  Nondurables  448  8.02
Wholesale,  Retail,  and  Some
Services
831  14.88
Telephone  and  Television
Transmission
465  8.33
Others 979  17.53
Table  1  (Continued)
Firm  and  Bond  Issue  Characteristics
Variables Mean  Median
Sales  3156.78  932.67
Assets 13,993.06  4144.60
ROA 0.76%  1.06%
Leverage  0.67  0.64
LtLev 0.34  0.31
M/B 2.20  2.17
RetVar 0.00  0.00
Collateral  0.40  0.36
Yield spread  257.19  181.00
Rating 13.47  14.00
Maturity  46.45  40.00
Proceeds 313.05  225.00
This table provides the distribution and the descriptive statistics
of 5608 firm-quarter observations over the period from 1980 to
2012 for the pooled sample. Sales is the net sales; Assets is the
book value of total assets; ROA is ratio of income before extraor-
dinary item to total assets; Leverage is the ratio of total debt to
total assets; LtLev is the long-term debt over total assets; M/B is
the market value of equity divided by the book value of equity;
RetVar is the variance of stock returns over one quarter prior
to bond issuance; Yield spread, measured in basis points, is the
difference between the bond’s yield at the time of issue and a
maturity-matched U.S. Treasury bond; Rating is the bond’s credit

























ing; Proceeds is the amount of the issue expressed in millions of
dollars.
hus,  the  sample  under  investigation  is  comprised  mostly  of
nvestment-grade  bonds.
ethodology
eal  activities  manipulation
ollowing  Roychowdhury  (2006)  and  Zang  (2012),  we  use
bnormal  discretionary  expenses  and  abnormal  production
ost  to  proxy  for  real  activities  manipulation.  Managers
an  increase  earnings  by  overproducing  inventory  to  report
ower  costs  of  goods  sold.  With  overproduction,  managers
an  spread  fixed  overhead  cost  over  a  larger  number
f  units,  thus  reducing  unit  cost  and  improving  mar-
ins  (Roychowdhury,  2006;  Cohen  et  al.,  2008;  Cohen  and
arowin,  2010).  Likewise,  managers  may  cut  discretionary
xpenditure  to  boost  earnings  in  the  short  run.  Discre-
ionary  expenditure  includes  research  and  development
R&D),  advertising,  and  selling,  general,  and  administrative
xpenses  (SG&A).  Consequently,  real  activities  manipulation
s  reflected  in  abnormal  levels  of  production  costs  and  dis-
retionary  expenses.
AA bond ratings and decreases the value by 1 for each succeeding
ating until we reach 1 for D-rated bonds. If the S&P ratings are
issing, we use Moody’s ratings in its place. Note that AAA rep-






























































































An  abnormal  cost  represents  the  difference  between  the
ctual  and  expected  costs.  To  estimate  the  expected  level
f  production  costs,  we  use  the  following  model:
PRODi,t
Ai,t−1




















+  i,t (1)
here  PRODi,t is  the  sum  of  the  cost  of  goods  sold  and
he  change  in  inventory  from  the  previous  quarter  of  firm
 in  quarter  t;  At−1 is  the  total  assets  of  firm  i  in  quarter
 −  1;  Salesi,t is  the  net  sales  of  firm  i  in  quarter  t;  and
Salesi,t is  the  change  in  net  sales  of  firm  i from  quar-
er  t  −  1  to  t.  Eq.  (1)  is  estimated  cross-sectionally  using
obust  standard  errors  for  each  industry-quarter  with  at
east  15  observations.  Industry  is  classified  using  the  Fama
nd  French  48-sector  codes.  The  abnormal  level  of  produc-
ion  cost  (RM  PROD) is  measured  as  the  residuals  from  Eq.
1)  (i,t).  The  higher  the  residuals,  the  larger  is  the  amount
f  abnormal  production  costs,  and  the  greater  is  the  increase
n  reported  earnings  through  reduction  in  the  cost  of  goods
old.
We  estimate  the  expected  level  of  discretionary  expen-
iture  using  the  following  model:
DISXi,t
Ai,t−1










+  ei,t (2)
here  DISXt represents  discretionary  expenditures  (i.e.,  the
um  of  R&D,  advertising,  and  SG&A  expenditures)  of  firm  i
n  quarter  t;  At−1 is  the  total  assets  of  firm  i  in  quarter  t −  1;
alesi,t is  the  net  sales  of  firm  i in  quarter  t.  The  abnor-
al  level  of  discretionary  expenditures  is  measured  as  the
stimated  residuals  from  the  regression  (ei,t).
Based  on  the  above  equations,  firms  engaging  in  RM  will
eport  positive  residuals  from  Eq.  (1)  and  negative  residu-
ls  from  Eq.  (2).  To  obtain  a  composite  score  representing
otal  RM,  we  first  multiply  the  residuals  from  Eq.  (2)  by  −1
efore  adding  them  to  the  corresponding  firm-quarter  resid-
als  from  Eq.  (1)  (see  Eq.  (3)  below).  This  transformation
llows  for  a  straightforward  interpretation  of  RM  from  Eq.
3),  i.e.,  higher  values  are  associated  with  greater  real  activ-
ties  manipulations.  This  transformation  is  consistent  with
ther  studies  (for  instance,  Zang,  2012).  To  preserve  consis-
ency,  in  the  remainder  of  the  paper,  (RM  DISX) is  presented
s  the  residual  from  Eq.  (2)  multiplied  by  −1.
M  =  RM  PROD  +  RM  DISX  (3)
nexpected  real  activities  manipulation
or  robustness  checks,  we  also  compute  proxies  of  unex-
ected  real  activities  manipulation (U  RM) following  Zang
2012).  Under  this  method,  the  costs  and  benefits  of  engag-
ng  in  RM  are  proxied  using  a  range  of  variables  as  in  Eq.  (4).
he  residual  from  the  equation  represents  the  unexpected
evel  of  real  activities  manipulation  (i.e.,  U  RM).  To  pre-
erve  space,  we  refer  the  avid  reader  to  Zang  (2012)  for  an
n-depth  explanation  of  how  the  various  variables  from  Eq.
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Mi,t =  ı0 +  ı1Market  Sharei,t−1 +  ı2Zscorei,t−1 +  ı3Insti,t−1
+  ı4NOAi,t−1 +  ı5Cyclei,t−1 +  ı6LMCi,t +  ı7RNDRi,t
+  ı8DEBTRi,t +  ı9MBi,t +  ı10ROAi,t +  ui,t (4)
here  RMi,t is  the  total  real  earnings  management  of  firm  i
n  quarter  t  obtained  from  Eq.  (3). The  proxy  for  the  costs
f  RM  includes  the  firm’s  market  share,  Z-score  and  insti-
utional  ownership (Inst).  Under  Zang’s  (2012)  framework,
rms  use  AM  at  yearend  when  RM  falls  short  of  expecta-
ions.  Thus,  Eq.  (4)  also  controls  for  the  costs  of  AM  using
he  firm’s  net  operating  assets (NOA) and  its  operating  cycle
Cycle).  The  remainder  are  control  variables  in  the  form  of
rm  size  (LMC),  research  and  development  expense  ratio
RNDR),  debt  ratio  (DEBTR),  market-to-book  ratio  (MB)  and
eturn  on  asset  (ROA).  We  elaborate  on  the  construct  of
hese  variables  and  their  expected  relationship  with  RM  in
ppendix  1.
We  estimate  Eqs.  (1),  (2)  and  (3)  using  the  whole
opulation  of  897,269  non-financial  and  non-utility  firm-
uarter  observations  included  in  the  Compustat  Quarterly
atabase  from  1980  to  2012  then  we  merge  them  with  our
nal  database.  We  report  the  estimation  results  for  the
xpected  levels  of  RM  PROD,  RM  DISX  and  RM  in  Table  2.
he  regressions  are  estimated  cross-sectionally  for  each
ndustry-quarter  combination  with  at  least  15  observations.
e  winsorize  the  coefficients  at  the  top  and  bottom  1%  levels
o  avoid  extreme  observations.
On  average,  each  industry-quarter  regression  has  more
han  120  observations.  All  the  mean  coefficients  are  sig-
ificant  at  the  1%  level  and  qualitatively  similar  to  those
eported  in  Roychowdhury  (2006)  and  Zang  (2012).  The  mean
djusted  R2 is  68%  for  the  production  cost  model  and  32%  for
he  discretionary  expenditure  model.  These  models  have  as
uch  explanatory  power  as  those  in  Roychowdhury  (2006)
nd  Zang  (2012).
We  present  the  results  from  the  regressions  to  derive
he  earnings  management  measures  from  Eqs.  (1)  and  (2)
n  Panel  A  of  Table  2. The  result  from  the  estimation  of  the
nexpected  real  activities  manipulation  (Eq.  (4))  is  reported
n  Panel  B  in  Table  4.  Related  descriptive  statistics  are  pre-
ented  in  Panel  C  of  Table  2.  Consistent  with  the  results
eported  by  Zang  (2012),  the  mean  value  of  RM  PROD  is
egative,  RM  is  zero,  and  RM  DISX  is  positive.
nivariate  tests
e  evaluate  the  level  of  real  activities  manipulation  in
he  8  quarters  leading  to  and  the  4  quarters  following  the
ond  issues.  We  use  four  measures  to  proxy  real  activities
anipulation  (i.e.,  RM,  RM  PROD,  RM  DISX,  and  U  RM).  The
raditional  t-  and  non-parametric  Wilcoxon  tests  are  used  to
est  for  significant  changes  in  the  proxy  variables.
ultiple  regressions
e  run  multiple  regressions  to  test  the  effects  of  RM  and
 RM  while  controlling  for  a  range  of  factors  as  in  Eqs.  (5)
nd  (6), respectively.  To  account  for  firms  with  multiple  bond
ssues,  we  correct  the  standard  errors  for  firm-clustering
ffect  following  Rogers  (1993).  The  firm-clustering  cor-
ected  standard  errors  allow  for  intra-group  correlation  by
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Table  2  Measurement  of  Real  Activities  Manipulation.
Panel  A  --  Estimation  of  the  normal  levels  of  production  costs  (PROD)  &  discretionary  expenditures  (DISX)

















Mean  R2 0.69  0.34
Mean Adj.  R2 0.68  0.32
Mean #  of  obs. 139.2  124.6
Panel B  --  Estimation  of  the  unexpected  total  real  earnings  management  (RM)
























Mean Adj.  R2 0.122
Panel C  --  Summary  statistics  for  real  activities  manipulation
Variable  N  Mean  Median  Std.  Dev.  25%  75%
RM  878,823  0.000  0.051  1.473  −0.524  0.604
RM PROD  878,823  −0.003  −0.044  0.916  −0.370  0.302
RM DISX  878,823  0.003  0.114  0.905  −0.202  0.389
U RM  835,916  −0.001  0.022  1.030  −0.402  0.429
Panel A represents the regressions to obtain the abnormal level of production costs and discretionary expenditure (i.e., RM PROD and
RM DISX, respectively). Panel B represents the regressions of the real earnings management variables whereby the error terms represent
the corresponding unexpected levels of real earnings management (i.e., U RM). Panel C represents summary statistics of the various real
earnings management variables. *, **, and *** significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table  3  Real  activities  manipulation  around  bond  issuances.
Relative  quarter  RM  PROD  (N  =  5584)  RM  DISX  (N  =  5584)  RM  (N  =  5584)  U  RM  (N  =  5584)
Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median  Mean  Median
−8  −0.010  −0.017  0.130  0.144  0.117  0.110  0.028  0.027
−7 −0.002  −0.014  0.132  0.147  0.129  0.120  0.048  0.036
−6 −0.011  −0.020  0.129  0.149  0.117  0.112  0.036  0.030
−5 −0.012  −0.017  0.127  0.143  0.114  0.117  0.033  0.032
−4 −0.008 −0.016  0.127  0.147  0.119  0.124  0.041  0.040
−3 −0.001 −0.006 0.128  0.141  0.127  0.121  0.046  0.042
−2 −0.008 −0.013 0.137  0.146  0.129  0.127  0.042  0.041
−1 0.012 −0.008 0.129  0.141  0.144  0.124  0.052  0.049
0 0.022  0.002  0.126  0.144  0.150  0.133  0.060  0.042
1 0.005  0.000  0.145  0.150  0.148  0.142  0.053  0.047
2 0.005  −0.010  0.142  0.145  0.147  0.135  0.054  0.044
3 0.005  −0.009  0.155  0.150  0.160  0.146  0.057  0.043
4 −0.004 −0.009 0.149  0.152  0.145  0.131  0.047  0.040
Mean (−8,−5) −0.009 −0.008 0.128  0.143  0.118  0.121  0.035  0.032
Mean (−4,−1) −0.001 0.000  0.130  0.141  0.130  0.129  0.045  0.038
Mean (+1,+4) 0.003  0.002  0.148  0.150  0.150  0.147  0.053  0.041
(−8,−5) vs.  (−4,−1) 0.0083  0.0042  0.0026  −0.0030  0.0124  0.0010  0.0098  0.0030
(1.98**) (1.20)  (0.82)  (−0.786) (2.29**)  (1.13)  (2.12**)  (1.62)
(−4,−1) vs.  (+4,+1) 0.0036  0.0014  0.0179  0.0071  0.0204  0.0079  0.0088  0.0019











































This table presents each individual real earnings management mea
in quarter 0. *, **, and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%
elaxing  the  usual  requirement  that  the  observations  be
ndependent.  Thus,  the  observations  are  independent  across
rms  but  not  necessarily  within  firms.
Mi,j =  ı0 +
∑4
j=−8
ı1,jDQi,j +  ı2Market  Sharei,j−1
+  ı3Zscorei,j−1 +  ı4Insti,j−1 +  ı5NOAi,j−1 +  ı6Cyclei,j−1
+  ı7LMCi,j +  ı8RNDRi,j +  ı9DEBTRi,j +  ı10MBi,j
+  ı11ROAi,j +  εi,j (5)
 RMi,j =  0 +
4∑
j=−8
1,jDQi,j +  2LMCi,j +  3MBi,j
+  4ROAi,j +  εi,j (6)
here  RMi,j and  U  RMi,j are  as  explained  earlier.  DQ  is  a
ummy  variable  representing  the  number  of  a  quarter  rel-
tive  to  quarter  0,  which  is  the  quarter  of  the  bond  issue.
or  example,  eight  quarters  prior  to  the  quarter  of  issue  will
ake  a  value  of  −8.
To  establish  the  effects  of  RM  on  the  bonds’  yield  spreads,
e  run  the  following  model,  which  is  similar  to  Liu  et  al.
2010):
Si,j =  0 +  1EMi,j−1 +  2LTAi,j +  3ROAi,j +  4DEBTi,j
+  5MBi,j +  6RVi,j−1 +  7Colli,j +  8LPi,j
+  9LMi,j +  10Ratingi,j +  i,j (7)
here  YSi,t is  the  proceeds-weighted  bond  yield  spread  of





i.e., RM PROD, RM DISX, RM, and U RM) around the bond offerings
l, respectively.
eal  activities  manipulations  of  firm  i in  quarter  j  −  1;  LTAi,j
s  the  natural  logarithm  of  total  asset  for  firm  i  in  quarter
 (note  that  larger  firms  tend  to  be  less  risky  and  may  ben-
fit  from  lower  cost  of  debt);  ROAi,j is  the  return  on  asset
omputed  as  the  ratio  of  net  income  to  total  assets;  DEBTi,j
s  the  ratio  of  total  debt  to  total  assets;  MBi,j is  the  market
alue  of  asset  divided  by  the  book  value  of  assets;  Colli,j is
 proxy  for  a  firm’s  value  of  collaterals,  which  is  measured
s  the  ratio  of  property,  plan,  and  equipment  (PPE)-to-total
ssets  (firms  with  higher  collaterals  represent  lower  risk  to
nvestors  and  may  benefit  from  a  lower  cost  of  debt);  RVi,j is
he  variance  of  daily  stock  returns  in  the  quarter  preceding
he  bond  issue;  LPi,j is  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  total  pro-
eeds  from  the  bond  issue;  LMi,j is  the  natural  logarithm  of
he  number  of  quarters  to  maturity  for  a  bond  (if  a  firm  has
ore  than  one  bond  issue  in  a  quarter  LPi,j and  LMi,j are  the
roceeds-weighted  average  of  all  bonds  for  firm  i in  quar-
er  j);  Ratingi,j is  the  proceeds-weighted  numerical  credit
atings  of  a  bond  and  it  is  proceeds-weighted  for  a  firm.
mpirical results
nivariate  results  --  real  activities  manipulation
round  bond  issues
able  3  reports  the  mean  real  activities  manipulation  varia-
les  by  quarters  surrounding  quarter  0,  i.e.,  the  quarter  of
he  issue.  The  differences  in  the  mean  values  of  RM  PROD,
M  and  U RM  between  quarters  −8 to  −5  and  quarters  −4
o  −1  are  positive  and  statistically  significant.  Starting  with
uarter  −5,  the  quarterly  mean  values  of  the  different  prox-










Real  earnings  management  activities  prior  to  bond  issuance  
This  trend  is  better  illustrated  in  Fig.  1.  The  univariate  tests
show  high  levels  of  real  earnings  management  in  the  four
quarters  leading  up  to  the  bond  issue.
Cross-sectional  results  --  real  activities
manipulation around  bond  issue
In  this  section,  we  test  for  the  pre-issue  high  levels  of  RM
using  multiple  regression  analysis  and  present  our  findings
in  Table  4.  Panel  A  presents  the  results  of  total  real  earn-
ings  management  (RM)  and  panel  B  analyses  the  unexpected
real  earnings  management  (U  RM).  The  coefficient  of  the
dummy  variable  representing  the  quarters  (−4,  −1)  is  higher
in  magnitude  than  the  coefficient  of  the  dummy  variable





Table  4  Cross-sectional  analysis  of  real  activities  manipulation  a
Indep.  Vars.  Panel  A  --  RM  
Model  1  Model  2
DQ(−8,−5) −0.015  
(−2.478










Market Share −0.056  0.056
(−1.259)  (−1.259
Zscore −0.01  −0.01
(−0.297)  (−0.297
Inst −0.005  −0.005
(−0.524)  (−0.524




SOX −0.073  −0.073
(−3.377***)  (−3.378
NOA −0.008  −0.008
(−0.426)  (−0.426
Cycle −0.039  −0.039
(−1.726*)  (−1.726
RNDR −0.001  −0.001
(−1.020)  (−0.979
DEBTR 0.038  0.038
−1.444 −1.444
R-squared  0.107  0.107  
F 6.776***  9.577***
Observations  47,891  47,891  
This table presents the multiple regressions of the total real earning
variables (U RM). *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% l
for firm-level clustering effects.171
eal  earnings  management  are  higher  in  the  quarters  closer
o  the  bond  issue.
ield  spreads  and  real  activities  manipulation
round  bond  issues
n  this  section,  we  examine  the  relationship  between  firms’
se  of  RM  prior  to  issuing  bonds  and  the  cost  of  their
ebt,  which  is  proxied  by  the  bond’s  yield  spread.  As  per
q.  (7),  we  regress  the  yield  spread  on  the  real  earnings
anagement  variables  as  well  as  several  control  varia-
les,  which  include,  among  other  things,  the  bond’s  credit
atings.  The  ratings,  though,  are  highly  influenced  by  sev-
ral  variables  that  are  already  included  in  the  regression
nd  pause  an  issue  of  multicollinearity.  To  account  for  the
round  bond  issues.
Panel  B  --  U  RM








) (−1.623)  (−1.623)
−0.166  −0.166
***) (−5.129***)  (−5.129***)
−0.034  −0.034









 4.550***  9.074***
68,736  68,736
s management (RM) and unexpected real earnings management
evels, respectively. T-values are in parenthesis and are adjusted














































Table  5  Orthogonalized  credit  ratings  regression.






































igure  1  Total  real  activities  manipulation  (RM)  around  bond
ssuances.
ulticollinearity,  we  first  orthogonalize  the  credit  ratings
ariable  using  Eq.  (8)  (similar  to  Ashbaugh-Skaife  et  al.,
006;  Liu  et  al.,  2010).  Specifically,  we  regress  the  ratings
ariable  on  the  other  control  variables  and  use  the  error
erms  from  the  regression  in  place  of  the  raw  ratings  scores.
atingi,j =  ˛0 +  ˛1LTAi,j +  ˛2ROAi,j +  ˛3DEBTi,j +  ˛4MBi,j
+  ˛5RVi,j−1 +  ˛6Colli,j +  ˛7LPi,j +  ˛8LMi,j +  i,j
(8)
The  variables  are  as  defined  earlier.  The  regression
esults  from  Eq.  (8)  are  presented  in  Table  5.  As  expected,
ost  of  the  independent  variables  are  significantly  related
o  the  ratings  variable  and  are  of  the  correct  sign.  For
nstance,  higher  values  of  Total  Assets,  Return  on  Assets
nd  Market-to-Book  ratios  are  associated  with  higher  rat-
ngs  scores,  since  large  and  profitable  organizations  are  less
ikely  to  default.
Table  6  presents  the  estimation  results  of  Eq.  (7)  (i.e.,
he  yield  spread  regressions)  with  the  standard  errors  cor-
ected  for  firm-clustering  effects.  We  test  the  effect  of  two
ariables,  i.e.,  the  extent  of  RM  in  the  quarter  prior  to  the
ond  issue  (i.e.,  RMt−1)  and  over  the  four  quarters  imme-
iately  preceding  the  issue  (RMmean(−4,−1)).  Both  coefficients
re  negative  and  statistically  significant  suggesting  the  exist-
nce  of  an  inverse  association  between  pre-bond  issue  real
arnings  management  and  the  bond  yield  spread.  There-
ore,  firms  that  are  associated  with  higher  pre-issue  earnings
anagement  benefit  from  a  lower  cost  of  debt.
obustness  checks
ndogeneity  issue
he  relationship  between  bond  yield  spread  and  real  activ-
ties  manipulation  may  not  be  unidirectional;  these  two
lements  could  be  jointly  determined,  which  would  bias  our
ndings.  To  address  the  potential  endogeneity  concern,  we
stimate  a  system  of  structural  equations  using  the  three-
tage  least  square  (3SLS)  model.  In  the  first  equation,  Yield
pread  (YS)  is  the  dependent  variable  and  in  the  second





the bond credit ratings using Eq. (9). *, ** and *** indicate sig-
nificance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-values are in
parenthesis and are adjusted for firm-level clustering effects.
ependent  variable.  In  both  equations,  the  first  lagged  val-
es  of  YS  and  RM  act  as  endogenous  instrument  variables
following  Kim  and  Park,  2005;  Liu  et  al.,  2010).  More  specif-
cally,  we  estimate  the  following  two  models  as  in  Eqs.  (9)
nd  (10):
Si,j =  ˇ0 +  ˇ1EMi,j−1 +  ˇ2LTAi,j +  ˇ3ROAi,j +  ˇ4DEBTi,j
+  ˇ5MBi,j +  ˇ6RVi,j−1 +  ˇ7Colli,j +  ˇ8LPi,j +  ˇ9LMi,j
+  ˇ10Ratingi,j +  i,j (9)
Mi,t =  ϑ0 +  ϑ1MIi,t−1 +  ϑ2AMi,t +  ϑ3Zscorei,t +  ϑ4BIG8i,t
+  ϑ5ARMi,t +  ϑ6SOXi,t +  ϑ7Cyclei,t +  ϑ8NOAi,t +  ϕi,t
(10)
The  variables  are  as  defined  earlier,  except  for  the  fol-
owing:  AM  is  a  proxy  variable  for  accruals  management  using
ones  (1991)  model;  BIG8  is  a  dummy  variable  representing
rms  audited  by  one  of  the  Big  8  US  auditing  firms,  else  it
akes  a  value  of  zero;  and,  SOX  is  an  indicator  variable  rep-
esenting  the  years  post  2002  Sarbanes  Oxley  Act.  The  latter
wo  variables  are  associated  with  more  accounting  scrutiny
nd  less  earnings  management.
We  present  our  findings  in  Table  7. Consistent  with  the
rior  findings,  the  RM  variable  from  the  prior  quarter  is
egatively  and  significantly  related  to  the  firm’s  bond  yield
pread.  Thus,  firms  that  engage  in  higher  levels  of  real  earn-
ngs  management  in  the  quarter  preceding  their  bond  issue
enefit  from  a  lower  yield  spread.
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Table  6  Cross-sectional  regressions  of  yield  spreads  on  real
activities  manipulation.





TA −0.743***  −0.741***
(−31.762)  (−31.711)
ROA −10.078***  −10.004***
(−9.139) (−9.187)




MB −0.600***  −0.607***
(−16.366)  (−16.487)
RV 2.754**  2.752**
(1.978)  (1.971)
LP 0.805***  0.804***
(20.241)  (20.291)
LM −0.405***  −0.404***
(−8.569)  (−8.548)
Rating −0.331***  −0.332***
(−31.482)  (−31.524)
Constant 5.007***  5.005***
(19.054)  (19.050)
Adj R2 0.586  0.587
F-statistics  218.8***  218.9***
Observations  4893  4893
This table reports the cross-sectional regressions of the yield
spread following Eq. (7). *, ** and *** indicate significance at
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-values are in parenthesis
Table  7  Robustness  Regressions  1  --  three-stage  least
squares  regressions.
Variables  Dependent
variable  =  YS
Dependent





































Constant 4.730***  −0.278
(17.706)  (−1.517)
R-squared  0.442  0.062

2 3581***  231.4***
Observations  2989  2989
This table presents a system of structural equations using the
three-stage least square (3SLS) model. In the first equation, Yield
Spread (YS) is the dependent variable and in the second equa-
tion Total Real Earnings Management (i.e., RM) is the dependent
variable. In both equations, the first lagged values of YS and RM
are endogenous explanatory variables. *, ** and *** indicate sig-
fi
t
Furthermore,  we  compute  earnings  volatility  as  the  standardand are adjusted for firm-level clustering effects.
The  effects  of  size  of  the  issue,  bond  maturity,  market
capitalization,  earnings  volatility  and  SEO
We  examine  whether  the  inverse  relationship  between  cor-
porate  bond  yield  spread  and  real  activities  manipulation
varies  by  bond  issues  and  issuer  characteristics,  respectively.
First,  we  divide  the  sample  by  issue  size,  which  we  measure
using  the  ratio  of  issue  size-to-total  assets.  To  the  extent
that  RM  benefits  bond  issues  by  reducing  the  cost  of  debt,
then  larger  bond  issues  should  benefit  greatly.  The  results
in  models  1  and  2  of  Table  8  show  that  the  coefficients  on
RMmean(−4,−1) are  negative  and  significant  at  the  5%  level  for
smaller  issues  and  statistically  insignificant  for  larger  issues.
Thus,  the  inverse  effect  of  RM  on  bond  spread  is  significant
amongst  smaller  issues.
Second,  we  divide  the  sample  by  the  bond’s  maturity.
Models  3  and  4  of  Table  8  shows  that  the  coefficients  of
RMmean(−4,−1) are  negative  and  significant  at  the  5%  level  for
both  short  and  long  maturities.
Next,  we  examine  if  the  RM  effect  on  yield  spread  is
dependent  on  bond’s  ratings.  Models  5  and  6  of  Table  8  show
that  firms  that  issue  investment  grade  bonds  (ratings  greater
than  12)  engage  in  more  real  activities  manipulations  than
noninvestment  grade  bonds.
d
I
nificance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-values are in
parenthesis and are adjusted for firm-level clustering effects.
In  Models  7  and  8  of  Table  8, we  examine  the  effect  of  the
rm  market  capitalization,  and  find  that  the  inverse  rela-
ionship  between  RM  and  YS  exists  only  for  large  issuers.eviation  of  the  issuing  firm’s  Income  Before  Extraordinary








Table  8  Robustness  Regressions  2  --  regressions  by  subsamples.



























RMmean(−4,−1) −0.099**  −0.018  −0.075**  −0.086**  0.028  −0.079**  −0.061  −0.079*  −0.061  −0.079*
(−2.421) (−0.462) (−2.014)  (−2.413)  (0.485)  (−2.464)  (−1.484)  (−1.830)  (−1.484)  (−1.830)
TA −0.471*** −0.918***  −0.826***  −0.459***  −0.849***  −0.242***  −0.811***  −0.449***  −0.811***  −0.449***
(−8.989) (−14.421)  (−19.665)  (−11.536)  (−12.157)  (−6.589)  (−14.730)  (−10.133)  (−14.730)  (−10.133)
ROA −6.417*** −9.488***  −10.639***  −2.432*  −9.606***  −3.168*  −10.634***  −6.412***  −10.634***  −6.412***
(−3.227) (−5.605)  (−6.041)  (−1.775)  (−5.305)  (−1.712)  (−5.266)  (−2.924)  (−5.266)  (−2.924)
DEBT 1.177*** 2.240***  2.292***  1.138***  2.298***  0.859***  2.366***  1.215***  2.366***  1.215***
(3.961) (13.679)  (10.460)  (4.904)  (9.188)  (4.795)  (10.645)  (4.791)  (10.645)  (4.791)
Coll −0.059 0.283*  0.263  −0.039  0.471**  −0.065  0.283  0.188  0.283  0.188
(−0.430) (1.808)  (1.643)  (−0.324)  (2.483)  (−0.688)  (1.526)  (1.494)  (1.526)  (1.494)
MB −0.402*** −0.842***  −0.671***  −0.340***  −1.129***  −0.306***  −1.045***  −0.370***  −1.045***  −0.370***
(−8.606) (−10.945)  (−10.143)  (−7.193)  (−8.040)  (−8.358)  (−8.800)  (−9.012)  (−8.800)  (−9.012)
RV 800.029*** 1.984**  2.459**  452.986***  1.721**  886.513***  1.916**  470.919**  1.916**  470.919**
(5.441) (2.277)  (2.083)  (5.075)  (2.266)  (4.613)  (2.242)  (2.334)  (2.242)  (2.334)
LP 0.467*** 1.118***  0.924***  0.445***  0.910***  0.336***  0.995***  0.543***  0.995***  0.543***
(7.377) (14.122)  (12.655)  (8.680)  (9.002)  (5.743)  (13.599)  (7.704)  (13.599)  (7.704)
LM −0.122** −0.932***  −0.772***  −0.180**  −2.393***  −0.002  −0.732***  −0.126**  −0.732***  −0.126**
(−2.101) (−6.500)  (−5.388)  (−2.433)  (−7.070)  (−0.036)  (−5.467)  (−2.012)  (−5.467)  (−2.012)
Rating −0.222*** −0.345***  −0.364***  −0.199***  −0.363***  −0.109***  −0.385***  −0.202***  −0.385***  −0.202***
(−9.843) (−17.181)  (−18.262)  (−13.130)  (−10.287)  (−6.272)  (−18.240)  (−9.341)  (−18.240)  (−9.341)
Constant 3.464*** 5.985***  5.715***  3.642***  10.166***  1.528***  5.706***  2.775***  5.706***  2.775***
(7.261) (13.408)  (10.563)  (8.049)  (11.243)  (4.968)  (9.709)  (5.416)  (9.709)  (5.416)
Adj R2 0.492  0.570  0.589  0.585  0.324  0.302  0.586  0.453  0.586  0.453
F-statistics 96.94***  307.5***  415.7***  110.8***  58.75***  68.61***  336.1***  140.0***  336.1***  140.0***
Observations 2575  2318  3674  1219  1719  3174  2287  2606  2287  2606
This table presents the cross-sectional regressions of the yield spread by various subsamples. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Real  earnings  management  activities  prior  to  bond  issuance  
Table  9  Regression  of  yield  spreads  on  RM  excluding  SEO
firms.
Variables  Model  1  Model  2
RMmean(−4,−1) −0.105** −0.105**
(−2.116)  (−1.970)
LMC −0.607***  −0.607***
(−15.535)  (−11.643)
ROA −9.767***  −9.767***
(−6.458)  (−4.328)








LP 0.853***  0.853***
(15.204)  (9.489)
LM −0.439***  −0.439***
(−5.955)  (−4.766)
Rating −0.354***  −0.354***
(−24.271)  (−15.787)
Constant 3.149***  3.149***
(8.966)  (7.391)
Adj R2 0.511  0.511
F 115.2***  189.2***
Observations  2347  2347
This table reports the cross-sectional regressions of the yield
spread following Eq. (7) and control for a subsample that








































the debt issue. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. T-values are in parenthesis and are
adjusted for firm-level clustering effects.
We  hypothesize  that  issuers  with  higher  earnings  volatility
would  engage  in  above  average  RM  to  smoothen  the  volatil-
ity.  Models  9 and  10  of  Table  8  show  that  the  coefficient
of  RMmean(−4,−1) is  negative  and  significant  at  the  10%  level
for  issuers  associated  with  higher  earnings;  the  coefficient  is
not  statistically  significant  amongst  issuers  associated  lower
earnings  volatility.  Thus,  real  activities  manipulation  is  more
likely  to  result  in  lower  yield  spread  when  the  earnings  of
the  issuer  is  more  volatile.
Since  Cohen  and  Zarowin  (2010)  document  that  SEO






Market  share  measures  fir
the quarter;  it  is  the  ratio
industry  using  3-digit  SIC  
Zscore Zscorei,t−1 Z-score  is  a  modified  vers
proxies for  a  firm’s  financ
finance  researchers  (Allay
values of  Z-score  indicate
with real  activities  manip175
nderperformance  post-SEO  is  explained  by  real  activities
anipulation;  we  exclude  firms  that  conduct  both  SEOs  and
ebt  issues  in  the  same  quarter,  and  re-estimate  equation  (7)
sing  the  revised  sample,  and  present  our  findings  in  Table  9.
he  results  from  Models  1  and  2  are  not  driven  by  SEO  firms.
he  estimated  coefficient  of  RMmean(−4,−1) is  negative  and  sig-
ificant  at  the  5%  level.  Thus,  the  results  are  not  driven  by
EO  firms  only.
ummary and conclusions
his  paper  examines  how  real  activities  manipulations  by
ond  issuers  affect  their  yield  spread.  Extending  the  find-
ngs  of  Cohen  and  Zarowin  (2010), we  find  that  similar
o  equity  issuers,  bond  issuers  also  engage  in  real  activi-
ies  manipulations  in  the  quarters  immediately  preceding
he  bond  issues.  The  level  of  real  earnings  manipulations
s  statistically  different  in  the  five  quarters  immediately
receding  the  bond  issue  than  the  remainder  quarters.  We
nd  that  the  propensity  to  engage  in  earnings  manipulations
ncreases  with  earnings  volatility,  size  and  profitability,  and
t  is  also  high  among  noninvestment-grade  bonds.  The  abnor-
ally  high-level  of  pre-issue  real  earnings  management  is
ssociated  with  lower  yield  spread.  This  relationship  affects
mall  issues,  investment-grade  bonds,  large  firms,  firms  with
olatile  earnings  and  low  profitability.  Thus,  issuers  that
ngage  in  real  activities  manipulations  prior  to  bond  issues
re  associated  with  lower  cost  of  bonds.
Managers  have  incentives  to  engage  in  real  earnings  man-
gement  (RM)  that  reduces  the  risk  premium  (Bhojraj  et  al.,
009;  Cohen  and  Zarowin,  2010;  Graham  et  al.,  2005).
hojraj  et  al.  (2009)  find  that  investors  overvalue  the  shares
f  firms  that  manage  to  just  beat  analysts’  forecasts  using
M.  Cohen  and  Zarowin  (2010)  find  that  investors’  over-
aluations  of  SEOs  are  a  direct  function  of  the  firm’s  real
ctivities  manipulations.  Thus,  there  is  ample  evidence  that
nvestors  misprice  RM  and  our  study  documents  similar  find-
ngs  in  the  market  for  new  bond  issues.  To  the  degree  that
ond  issuers  use  real  earnings  management  to  signal  their
uality  to  investors,  then  future  research  should  differenti-
te  between  good  and  bad  real  earnings  management  signals
nd  relate  them  to  the  cost  of  debt  capital.
ppendix 1. Control variable constructions
Eq. (4))
m’s  market  leader  status  in  the  industry  at  the  beginning  of
 of  company’s  sales  to  total  sales  of  its  industry.  We  define
codes  as  in  Harris  (1998).
ion  of  Altman’s  Z-score  (Altman,  1968;  Altman,  2000)  that
ial  condition  and  is  widely  used  by  the  financial  industry  and
annis  et  al.,  2003;  Bartram  et  al.,  2009;  Larkin,  2013).  Higher
 a  healthier  financial  condition  and  a  lower  cost  associated
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ppendix 2. Bond Rating Numerical
onversions
This  table  is  borrowed  from  Table  1  of  Klock  et  al.  (2005)
page  704  and  provides  the  bond  rating  conversion  codes  for
the Moody’s  and  S&P  ratings.
Conversion  Number  Ratings
Moody’s  S&P
22  Aaa  AAA
21 Aa1  AA+
20  Aa2  AA
19 Aa3  AA−
18  A1  A+
17  A2  A
16 A3  A−
15  Baa1  BBB+
14  Baa2  BBB
13 Baa3  BBB−
12  Ba1  BB+
11  Ba2  B+
10  Ba3  BB−
9  B1  B+
8  B2  B+7  B3  B−
6  Caa1  CCC+
5  Caa2  CCC
4 Caa3  CCC−
3  Ca  CC
2 C  C
1 D  D
C
C
C.  Mellado-Cid  et  al.
d  Earningsi,t
Ai,t
+  1.2 Working  Capitali,t
Ai,t
+  0.6 (Stock  Price×Shares  Outstanding)i,t
Total  Liabilitiesi,t
 in  quarter  t,  and  Ai,t is  the  total  asset  in  quarter  t.  We  use
e  quarter  to  capture  the  cost  of  real  activities  manipulation.
asured  by  the  number  of  institutional  investors  reported  on
titutional  ownership  indicates  high  costs  of  real  activities
itoring  role  of  institutional  owners.
g  assets  (NOA)  at  the  beginning  of  the  quarter  as:
shandMarketableSecuritiesi,t+TotalLiabilitiesi,t
Salesi,t
t  of  accrual  management  in  the  previous  period.  NOA  is
s  in  accrual  manipulation  in  previous  periods.
 equals  to  1  when  the  NOA  is  above  the  median  of  the
er,  and  zero  otherwise.
e  firm’s  operating  cycle  as  the  days’  receivable  plus  the
’  payables  at  the  beginning  of  the  quarter.  Firms  with  longer
r  flexibility  in  managing  accruals  since  they  have  larger
periods  for  accruals  to  reverse.
m  performance.
 of  market  capitalization  (LMC)  to  control  for  firm  size;
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